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Synthesis

A multilevel evolutionary framework for sustainability analysis
Timothy M. Waring 1, Michelle Ann Kline 2,3, Jeremy S. Brooks 4, Sandra H. Goff 5,6, John Gowdy 7, Marco A. Janssen 8, Paul E.
Smaldino 9 and Jennifer Jacquet 10
ABSTRACT. Sustainability theory can help achieve desirable social-ecological states by generalizing lessons across contexts and
improving the design of sustainability interventions. To accomplish these goals, we argue that theory in sustainability science must
(1) explain the emergence and persistence of social-ecological states, (2) account for endogenous cultural change, (3) incorporate
cooperation dynamics, and (4) address the complexities of multilevel social-ecological interactions. We suggest that cultural
evolutionary theory broadly, and cultural multilevel selection in particular, can improve on these fronts. We outline a multilevel
evolutionary framework for describing social-ecological change and detail how multilevel cooperative dynamics can determine
outcomes in environmental dilemmas. We show how this framework complements existing sustainability frameworks with a description
of the emergence and persistence of sustainable institutions and behavior, a means to generalize causal patterns across social-ecological
contexts, and a heuristic for designing and evaluating effective sustainability interventions. We support these assertions with case
examples from developed and developing countries in which we track cooperative change at multiple levels of social organization as
they impact social-ecological outcomes. Finally, we make suggestions for further theoretical development, empirical testing, and
application.
Key Words: cooperation; cultural evolution; multilevel selection; sustainability; theory
INTRODUCTION
To tackle the global sustainability crisis, societies need reliable
and generalizable knowledge about the functioning and
management of social-ecological systems (SESs). The immediacy
of this need raises both the stakes and the uncertainty of that
scientific project (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994). Correspondingly,
sustainability science blends the normative goal of achieving both
environmental protection and human well-being with positive
methods (sensu Stern 1993) for understanding humanenvironment interactions to help achieve that goal (Kates et al.
2001).
However, our current ability to generalize about SES dynamics is
inadequate. As Levin and Clark (2010:109) suggest, “we need to
understand at a more generalizable level which features of coupled
human-environment systems enhance and which constrain their
adaptability.” Also, although the positive science of sustainability
is rich in empirical case studies, generalization also requires
general theory. Therefore, we need a general sustainability theory,
particularly with regard to social systems. We offer a contribution
to that end by outlining a general framework for social-ecological
dynamics, demonstrating its application in specific cases, and
exploring its potential to assist in intervention design.
Sustainability scientists and practitioners currently use a variety
of conceptual and analytical frameworks (Binder et al. 2013),
including resilience (Folke et al. 2002), vulnerability (Turner et al.
2003), coupled human and natural systems (CHANs; Liu et al.
2007), and SESs (Ostrom 2009). These frameworks help to
characterize the internal causal structure that determines system
states such as CHANs and SESs, and the adaptive characteristics
of alternative system states such as resilience and vulnerability.
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These frameworks all build on a model of human-environmental
systems as complex adaptive systems (Levin et al. 2013), seek to
guide interventions and systemic change, and improve the
discovery of the factors that determine the resiliency or
vulnerability of individual systems. However, applying a
complex adaptive system perspective is challenging, and
generalization suffers from heterogeneity among frameworks
and disciplinary approaches. We propose a set of needs that
sustainability theory should address to help connect these
approaches.
The term “sustainability” has two connotations in the context
of an SES (Pezzey 1992:45). First, sustainability is a goal state
that includes the maintenance of the environment and human
well-being. Second, sustainability also means the durability of
a given state over time, i.e., its resilience to perturbation.
However, not all resilient states are desirable, nor are all desirable
states resilient. Therefore, we must distinguish between
characteristics of system states and transition dynamics between
states. Human values must determine the desired state
(normative component), whereas science must determine the
process to achieve and maintain that state (positive component).
To this end, sustainability theory should help explain the
emergence and persistence of social-ecological states.
System states and transitions often depend on the development
and transmission of behaviors, values, norms, and institutions,
i.e., on culture. Cultural evolution, meaning change in culture
over time, is generally more rapid than environmental change or
genetic evolution (Perreault 2012). Cultural change such as
innovation in resource exploitation often drives social-ecological
outcomes, which helps to explain why human factors now
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dominate the global biosphere (Vitousek 1997, Steffen et al. 2007).
Thus, sustainability theory must also include a causal model of
endogenous cultural processes.
Patterns of cooperation heavily influence social-ecological
outcomes. The most pernicious sustainability challenges, such as
carbon emissions or biodiversity loss, contain multiple
cooperation dilemmas. Because environmental conservation can
be costly for some, but yields benefits to others, it often conforms
to the game theoretic definition of cooperative behavior.
Therefore, sustainability science could benefit from insights on
the evolution of cooperation, and sustainability theory should
model the evolution of environmental cooperation.
Current multilevel frameworks such as Ostrom’s polycentric
approach (Ostrom 2010a, 2010b), panarchy (Gunderson and
Holling 2001), multilevel governance (Marks 1992, Marks et al.
1996), and others (Cash et al. 2006, Pahl-Wostl 2009) do not
contain general mechanisms of causation across levels of
organization, or guidance for designing policy in multilevel
contexts. For example, Ostrom (2010b) contends that polycentric
systems tend to increase cooperation, equity, and sustainability,
but does not explain the mechanisms by which a polycentric
arrangement facilitates these qualities. The panarchy model
includes multiple hierarchical levels, but the lack of specific social
processes makes panarchy difficult to apply. This is troubling for
those seeking to design effective interventions, because many
sustainability challenges are multilevel in nature. Therefore,
sustainability theory should help explain multilevel interactions.
We present an evolutionary framework for sustainability research
designed to explain the emergence and persistence of sustainable
social-ecological states by focusing on the dynamics of culture
and cooperation. Our framework constitutes a toolkit for
elucidating interactions across multiple levels of organization,
which serves to improve generalizability and inform the design of
interventions in the field.
CULTURAL EVOLUTION AND SUSTAINABILITY
Sustainability researchers have already begun to embrace
evolutionary explanations of human behavior to aid in
understanding and addressing the sustainability crisis (Penn 2003,
Beddoe et al. 2009, Ehrlich 2009, Kinzig et al. 2013, van Vugt et
al. 2014). Cultural evolution is particularly useful in describing
human-driven social-ecological change, such as the cultural
innovations by which humans exploit their environments (Boyd
et al. 2011) and the social adaptations (behaviors, beliefs,
language, values, norms and institutions) that constitute society
in human populations (Richerson and Boyd 2004, Mesoudi et al.
2006). Cultural evolution has found support from research in
anthropology (Tehrani and Collard 2002, Borgerhoff Mulder et
al. 2006), psychology (Mesoudi 2009, Livingstone et al. 2011),
economics (Bergstrom 2002, Bowles 2004), and political science
(Axelrod 1985, Ostrom 1990) and highlights their complementarities
(Mesoudi et al. 2006).
A cultural evolutionary approach to sustainability research helps
to meet the four needs articulated above. First, construing culture
and behavior as an evolving system facilitates the study of the
emergence and persistence of social-ecological states.
Mathematical models of cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson
1985, Turchin 2003, McElreath and Boyd 2007) and evolutionary

game theory (Maynard Smith 1974, Harms 2011) can assess the
stability of trait combinations in a population, reveal societal
equilibria, and provide insight into transitions between states.
Second, this theoretical work also provides mathematical tools
for understanding endogenous cultural phenomena, including
cumulative cultural adaptation (Enquist et al. 2011), ethnic
marking (McElreath et al. 2003), social stratification (Henrich
and Boyd 2008), organizational evolution (Cordes et al. 2008),
and institutions such as private property (Bowles and Choi 2013),
each of which has implications for sustainability. Third, cultural
evolutionary theory is closely tied to theory on the evolution of
cooperation. Many of the general factors that facilitate the
evolution of cooperation, such as reciprocity and group structure
(Nowak 2006), are further bolstered when cooperation can evolve
culturally (Bell et al. 2009) and when conformism, social identity,
reputation, and punishment are involved (Henrich 2004). Fourth,
evolutionary research on multilevel selection (Okasha 2006, Field
2008) provides a foundation determining when and how
cooperation can emerge because of competition between groups
(Gürerk et al. 2006, Puurtinen and Mappes 2009). Because the
sustainable use of resources often requires cooperation and
collective action, findings from the literature on cultural evolution
are of particular importance for sustainability research. We do
not attempt to explain whether or how culture evolves, because
others have done so sufficiently (Richerson and Boyd 2004,
Mesoudi 2011). Instead, our conceptual framework builds on a
few foundational considerations from this literature.
Foundational considerations
A complete model of individual behavior, group dynamics, or
multilevel interactions is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we
summarize some fundamental and widely acknowledged factors
that drive the evolution of culture: self-interest, cultural
transmission, cooperation, and the role of groups.
Self-interest
Self-interest is a central force in social, economic, and
environmental change. Humans often act in their own selfinterest, with a psychology guided by the forces of natural
selection to maximize evolutionary fitness (Cosmides and Tooby
1994). Utility maximization models have been very successful in
predicting proximate behavior based on self-interest alone.
However, self-interested behavior varies both within and between
populations (Henrich et al. 2010), in part because we learn about
behavioral options and inherit our preferences from others
through cultural transmission.
Cultural transmission
Humans learn cultural traits, e.g. behaviors, beliefs, language,
values, norms and institutions, from each other using
sophisticated learning strategies (Bandura 1971) that have been
incorporated into mathematical models of cultural evolution.
Some cultural traits are copied more than others, resulting in
selection for traits that fit a niche defined by social, economic,
psychological, and environmental factors. Cultural transmission
helps to explain human behavioral diversity (Gelfand et al. 2011,
Smith 2011). Over generations, transmission processes
accumulate cultural adaptations too complex for a single
individual to invent in one lifetime (Kirby et al. 2008, Lewis and
Laland 2012).
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Cooperation
Humans actively help one another, often at a personal cost and
even when there is no chance of reciprocation (Richerson and
Boyd 1998, Sober and Wilson 1999). Cooperation and prosocial
behavior are necessary for the existence of large-scale cooperative
systems including markets, nation states, and religions (Henrich
et al. 2010). Social systems are supported by human behavioral
adaptations such as reputation (Van Vugt et al. 2005), gossip
(Sommerfeld et al. 2007), and punishment (Boyd et al. 2003, 2010)
that stabilize cooperation in groups.
Groups
Humans are adapted to group life (Richerson and Boyd 2004).
We live in uniquely structured social groups (Gowdy and Krall
2015), signify group membership with cultural markers (Efferson
et al. 2008), and conform to group social norms (Coultas 2004).
Social groups facilitate the emergence of cooperation by allowing
cooperators to cluster and share the collective benefits of
cooperation (Wilson and Dugatkin 1997, Fletcher and Doebeli
2009). Groups also evolve. Groups whose members cooperate and
solve collective-action problems tend to grow and proliferate at
the expense of groups that fail to do so (Choi and Bowles 2007,
Boyd and Richerson 2009). Through this process, known as
cultural group selection (Henrich 2004, Boyd and Richerson
2010), successful group behaviors spread in a population of
groups despite being individually costly (Bowles et al. 2003,
Richerson et al. 2015). As a result, human groups display
emergent organizational behavior (Smaldino 2014) and grouplevel adaptations to environmental conditions (Ostrom 1990,
2014).
The cultural evolution of groups and organizations has direct
environmental consequences. Groups exploit resources, design
products, enforce environmental standards, and galvanize
political change. Cultural evolution gives us an expanded
framework for studying how any type of organization evolves in
response to social and ecological environments. For example,
competition between private enterprises (van den Bergh and
Gowdy 2009) for employees, supplies, and buyers drives business
and product innovation through a process of cultural evolution.
This competition can also select for strategies that shift costs
elsewhere by destroying natural resources or degrading social
capital. When nations change the environmental behavior of
industries through regulation, taxes, and labeling, they are
altering the selective pressures faced by corporations (Auld et al.
2008, Gulbrandsen 2009), which respond adaptively. Human
group-centric adaptations and cultural selection between groups
can also give rise to organizations capable of solving
environmental cooperation dilemmas (Ostrom 2000). However,
there is no guarantee that cooperation will emerge in any given
case because groups, like individuals, often evolve to act in their
short-term interest, recapitulating a tragedy of the commons at
a higher organizational level. Therefore, we must analyze the
emergence of cooperation between assemblies of groups as well
as between individuals. This requires a multilevel perspective.
CULTURAL MULTILEVEL SELECTION
Multilevel environmental governance remains an intransigent
problem because of the overwhelming complexity of untangling
causality and recommending intervention. Gupta (2007:132)
found that “there is no objective way to determine the appropriate

level of [policy or action on] climate change or other
environmental problems” in multilevel contexts. We propose that
cultural multilevel selection (CMLS) theory can be adapted to
address Gupta’s problem directly.
Multilevel selection (MLS) theory in biology clarifies
evolutionary processes when populations are structured in groups
(Okasha 2006, Simon et al. 2013). Within groups, selection is
driven by differences in fitness between members, or “relative
fitness.” Likewise, if groups compete within a supergroup,
selection of groups will depend on the relative fitness of groups.
MLS states that processes at both levels matter. MLS is
particularly useful for social dilemmas, in which the interests of
the group are at odds with those of individuals. Cooperative
individuals in a social dilemma benefit group members at a cost
to themselves, decreasing their relative fitness while increasing the
average fitness of the group. Consequently, the selection of
cultural traits at the group and individual levels will favor
conflicting outcomes, and the result is determined by the balance
of selection across levels (Fig. 1). Conflicts between levels of
selection are a generalizable theoretical tool, applying to any
social dilemma at any level, whether between nations in Europe
or between children on a sports team. The evolutionary
interactions between levels have been modeled in multiple ways
(Frank 1995, Simon et al. 2013), and the same formalisms can
serve as a general model for cultural change (El Mouden et al.
2014). Group-beneficial outcomes are more likely to evolve when
migration between groups is low, variation between groups is high,
and the individual cost of altruism is relatively low. This holds
true even when the cooperative individuals are at a disadvantage
within their own groups.
Fig. 1. A simplified graphical model of multilevel selection. In
social dilemmas, outcomes depend on the level of organization
on which selection operates most strongly. To determine the
dominant level of selection, the direction and magnitude of
selection at the relevant levels should be estimated and
compared.

The principles of MLS are already used to manage genetic
evolution. In animal husbandry, individual animals kept in pens
sometimes conflict aggressively with group members, reducing
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health and total productive growth. In these systems, human
breeders artificially increase the strength of between-group
selection by breeding animals from groups with high productivity
rather than choosing individuals with high productivity. This
results in less aggression, more growth, and higher total
productivity (Wade et al. 2010, Turner 2011).

provides a consistent system for organizing the facts of
environmental behavioral change. Finally, the CMLS approach
provides a comparative heuristic (visualized in Fig. 2) to identify
the appropriate level for policy intervention and a solution to the
problem Gupta identified.

CMLS considers the importance of group structure, relative
fitness, and conflicts between levels of selection as they operate
in human cultural systems. Group-level selection is enhanced in
cultural systems as opposed to biological ones because of factors
including conformity, ethnic marking, punishment, and cultural
equilibria (Vega-Redondo 1993, Richerson et al. 2015). Probably
as a result, culture displays greater variation between groups than
is found in genetic populations (Bell et al. 2009), making grouplevel selection more common. This suggests that conflicts between
levels of selection may be more common in cultural systems as
well.

Fig. 2. The cultural multilevel selection (CMLS) framework
provides a comparative heuristic for determining cooperative
outcomes in an environmental dilemma. The relationship
between the dominant level of selection (→ right arrow) and
the social scale of an environmental dilemma ({ right brace)
determines the spread of a cooperative environmental trait
(open circle). (A) When the dominant level of selection is below
that of the dilemma, selection on individuals favors
individualistic strategies, noncooperation (filled circle),
resulting in an unresolved dilemma. (B) When the dominant
level of selection is above that of the dilemma, selection on
groups favors group-functional traits, collective action,
individual cooperation (open circle) and a resolution to the
dilemma.

A MULTILEVEL SELECTION FRAMEWORK FOR
SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS
The central facet of our framework is that the hierarchical levels
of human social organization may operate as levels of selection
in the evolution of cultural traits, organizational features, and
environmental behavior. Modern human societies have many
organizational levels (e.g., individual, city, nation, international
body) across multiple domains (e.g., civic, enterprise, religious,
educational, recreational). Any domain could be an arena for
selection in a particular analysis (Wilson and Kniffin 1999, Wilson
et al. 2013). By comparing the dominant level of selection with
the organizational scale of the environmental dilemma, scientists
can better predict cooperative evolution and social-ecological
outcomes (Fig. 2). Group selection will tend to be stronger than
individual selection when (1) a greater fraction of total trait
variation occurs between groups than between individuals, (2) the
relative benefits to the group are greater, and (3) the costs to
altruistic individuals are lesser (Wilson et al. 2013). Conflicts
between levels of selection may exist without becoming outright
human conflicts, but may operate slowly, while driving long-term
social system change. This may be the case, for example, in many
of the environmental management dilemmas central to
sustainability research.
The greatest environmental dilemmas are regional or global
challenges, such as carbon emissions, overfishing, deforestation,
pollution, and freshwater conflicts. The interactions between
organizations and individuals at multiple levels make coherent
analysis and effective policy advice extremely challenging. We use
case studies to show that cultural multilevel selection helps us
assess the strength of cultural selection for environmental
behaviors on groups and individuals, and to understand why and
in what context costly conservation practices can emerge. To
understand and react to these challenges, we must assess the
patterns of variation, benefits, and costs for entities at each level.
Our framework yields several practical advantages to this end.
First, it identifies conflicts between levels of selection that drive
social evolution, allowing researchers to track cascades of social
change between levels. Second, the framework is a descriptive
construct, with no prescription of the desired system state or
assumptions about transitions between states. Third, the focus on
trait frequency, benefits, costs, and behavioral transmission

CASE NARRATIVES
The CMLS framework is designed to spur hypothesis generation
and testing. Before hypothesis testing is possible, however, we
must find common patterns across empirical cases. A set of
guiding questions helps to organize the empirical details of socialecological cases so that the framework may be fruitfully applied.
1. What is the focal trait (behavior, norm, or organizational
trait)? Describe the proximate function of the trait in an
environmental context, how it is transmitted, and whether
it is a cooperative trait, i.e., costly to the actor, beneficial to
others.
2. What is the organizational environment for that trait?
Describe the types of organizations involved, the
organizational niche and survival requirements of each type,
and how they interact within and across levels of
organization.
3. What are the levels of selection for that trait? Describe how
trait selection operates through the influence of
competition, migration, imitation, and demographic change
at each organizational level. Identify the dominant level of
selection.
4. What is the history of the trait? Describe any documented
change in trait distributions, individual and organizational
populations, and selection regimes. Identify changes in the
dominant level of selection over time.
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To illustrate the advantages of a multilevel evolutionary
approach, we have organized the details of existing SESs
according to the framework. The objective of this effort is to apply
a structured and consistent accounting of change to uncover
patterns and generate hypotheses. Each narrative lays out a coarse
history of change at multiple organizational levels following a
simple rubric and attempts to answer the guiding questions
outlined above. We present four short narratives spanning a range
of timespans, social scales, resource types, organizational forms,
and degrees of economic development as examples of how to use
guiding questions in a post hoc analysis.
Marine tenure institutions in Fiji
Traditional marine tenure systems in Fiji appear to have emerged
under conditions of strong community-level selection. These
systems collapsed after colonization and globalization resulted in
strong competition for fish resources at both the national and
individual levels (see Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Traditional fishing restrictions in Fiji may have lessened
because of a change in the dominant level of selection. Before
colonial rule, traditional chiefly fishing bans may have been
supported by competition between groups. Following
colonization, village level organization weakened, and Fiji
began to compete as a nation in global fish markets. Individual
competition for fish resources is higher, and village competition
for income also drives fishing efforts. Unrestrained harvest (–),
harvest restraint or limits (+), collective action (↑ up arrow),
group reinforces harvest restraint (↓ down arrow), group
weakens harvest restraint (dotted down arrow). Shaded cells
represent dominant level of selection.

Levels of selection
Prior to British colonization, Fijians engaged in subsistence
harvesting, while village chiefdoms managed marine resources
with traditional rules and competed through warfare. At the
individual level, we make the simplifying assumption that foragers
minimize effort to meet subsistence needs. This is consistent with
what present-day Fijians report (Golden et al. 2014). At the village
chiefdom level, each village has exclusive marine foraging rights
to bounded territories, so could benefit from sustainable
harvesting. Some village- and clan-level marine tenure systems in
the Pacific may serve this function through closing certain reef or
deep-sea fishing areas (Hviding and Ruddle 1991, Veitayaki 1998).
Under ecological stressors such as cyclones or droughts, villages
without norms to regulate harvesting may be more likely to suffer
a resource collapse. This situation would favor groups with more
conservative sustainable strategies. Prior to colonization, villages
also competed through warfare and politicking for access to
resources such as arable land, fresh water, and fishing grounds.
Warfare is resource intensive, and historical evidence indicates
that villages were easier to defend than to invade (Derrick 1946).
This suggests that between-village conflict would favor the
persistence and even the expansion of villages that enforced more
sustainable strategies for resource consumption.

Focal trait
Traditional fisheries regulations include exclusive clan ownership
of certain reefs, clan-specific prohibitions (tabu) on particular
marine resources, and temporary reef closures. These systems are
recognized for their value in conservation (Berkes et al. 2000) and
have been incorporated into modern ecological conservation
programs (Johannes 2002, Drew 2005), even as the sociocultural
norms that keep them in place are changing (Kuster et al. 2005).

History
Colonization precipitated two major changes that reduced the
primacy of the village level in all matters: the rise of commercial
fishing and the suppression of intervillage warfare. Local and
regional trade existed in Fiji prior to globalization, but Fiji’s
natural resources are now open to a vastly larger source of
demand. Thus, it appears the cultural evolutionary forces that
selected for traditional marine tenure practices in Fiji have
changed. At the village level, colonial rule has weakened chiefly
powers and duties, and marine tenure decisions now often depend
on general consensus. This makes decisions susceptible to
individual interests because they may require community
consensus. Rather than competing via warfare, villages now
compete for income and modern conveniences by selling local
resources, e.g., fish and crops, or by courting tourist traffic. At
the individual level, many contemporary Fijians forage for
subsistence, but also exchange resources for cash. Individuals can
accumulate wealth in this manner, even harvesting species that
are not eaten locally (Golden et al. 2014; M. A. Kline, unpublished
data). Villagers can now “vote with their feet” and move to villages
that are more market integrated or leave village life altogether
(Scheyvens 2008). Competition between villages may now favor
more exploitative foraging strategies that create greater market
integration.

Organizational context
Fijian society includes a social hierarchy in which households
(vuvale) are nested in extended households (itokatoka), one or
more of which comprise a clan (mataqali). Multiple clans
constitute a yavusa, the highest order kin group (sometimes an
entire village). Typically, villages have local chiefs, and clusters of
villages may have a paramount chief. Here we focus on three levels
of organization: (1) individual marine foragers, (2) village
chiefdoms, and (3) the nation-state of Fiji.

Summary
Our narrative suggests that in Fiji, strong individual selection for
unrestrained harvesting was initially held in check by selection
for marine foraging restrictions within clans and villages, spurred
by local resource competition and warfare. British colonization
of Fiji and continued integration with the global market altered
the dominant level of selection, strengthening the nation-state
and weakening the power of traditional village chiefs (White and
Lindstrom 1997).
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National environmental policy in Bhutan
The coincidence of Bhutan’s conservation policy and Gross
National Happiness (GNH) development framework, and their
articulation with a Buddhist national identity, reveal how
persistent external threats influenced policy selection at the
national level for sovereignty and resource protection (see Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. Bhutan’s environmental policy, which emerged as part of
a process to craft a national identity and may have been
influenced by the threat of annexation. From the 1600s through
the 1970s, Bhutan has experienced a series of external threats,
including the fall of peer societies to larger powers. These
pressures appear to have caused an attempt to fortify Bhutanese
sovereignty through cultural and religious consolidation. The
king of Bhutan declared the importance of Gross National
Happiness (GNH) in 1972 (Karma et al. 2012). GNH became a
set of development objectives and indicators, including
environmental status. Cooperative conservation policies (+),
collective action (e.g. political unification; ↑ up arrow), group
reinforces conservation behavior (↓ down arrow), competition
or threat (open star). Shaded cells represent dominant level of
selection.

Focal trait
Bhutan’s sustainable development approach aims to maximize
GNH and undergirds policies that have ensured high levels of
habitat protection (MAF 2010), decentralized natural resource
management (Brooks and Tshering 2010), constrained
individual-level resource use (Rinzin 2006, Brooks 2010, RGB
2010), and limited the environmental impact of commercial
ventures such as hydropower (NEC 2008), agriculture (Vidal and
Kelly 2013), and tourism. These polices constitute a social
dilemma in that they require individuals and groups to forgo
economic opportunities and wealth.
Organizational context
Bhutan contains four primary ethnic groups, each with distinct
clan lineages. These groups have been unified under the national
government, though not without conflict (Schappi 2005). Until
recently the king held dictatorial power in the country, eliminating
political competition and disagreement over policy. Bhutan
contends with other nations as well, including both small peer
nations (Himalayan Buddhist kingdoms) and large predatory
nations (Britain, China, India), which have annexed the peer
nations.
History
Historically, the geographically isolated communities of Bhutan
were culturally and linguistically diverse, but characterized by
high levels of internal conformity and cooperation (van Driem
1999, Ura 2004). Invasions in the 17th century lead to unification
under a theocratic ruler (Rose 1977), and 19th-century British

colonial advances contributed to the formation of a hereditary
monarchy in 1907 (Rose 1977, Ura 2004). More recent perceived
threats to Bhutan’s sovereignty included the annexation of
neighboring Buddhist Himalayan societies by China, which
occupied Tibet in 1959; and India, which annexed Sikkim in the
1970s; and the influx of Nepali immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s
(Priesner 1998, Brunet et al. 2001, Ura 2004). These threats, along
with diffuse forces of globalization (Ura 2004), were perceived as
jeopardizing Bhutan’s resources and autonomy. In response, the
Bhutanese government sought to foster a national cultural and
religious identity to protect the country’s sovereignty and security
(Planning Commission Secretariat 1999, Ura 2004). Buddhist
philosophy and practice influence most aspects of social, cultural,
and political life in Bhutan (Aris 1979) and serve as the bedrock
for Bhutan’s national identity (Priesner 1998, Ura 2004). The
GNH approach is also derived from aspects of Buddhist belief
and practice, especially the concept of the “middle path”
(Planning Commission Secretariat 1999). Thus, the emergence of
Bhutan’s sustainable development approach may be closely
related to the development of a Buddhist-based national identity
and may be a product of external existential threats to the country.
Levels of selection
Competition between ethnic communities and villages fueled
warfare (Vas 1986) that likely led to resource extraction. Persistent
external threats at the national level selected for efforts to protect
Bhutan by unifying distinct communities, aligning individual and
community interests, and inculcating a shared national identity.
However, consolidation comes with individual and community
costs. The alignment of the national benefits of sustainable
development and strengthened sovereignty with individual and
community benefits of greater well-being is evident in policies
that are guided by the GNH approach. As an example of the cost
of conservation, Bhutan’s forest policies limit household access
to timber to preserve 60% forest cover in perpetuity (MAF 2010).
However, Bhutan’s environmental policies are founded on
Buddhist beliefs, ethics, and cultural traditions, which may have
offset the costs to individuals and communities that result from
strict conservation policies. Additionally, Bhutan’s unique
national tourism policy places the high costs of reduced
environmental impact on visitors. Now Bhutan’s strategy may be
spreading via cultural transmission (RGB 2012) because several
countries, e.g. Germany, Canada, France, and China, have begun
to integrate measures of well-being to direct their own
development efforts (United Nations General Assembly 2011,
Brooks 2013).
Summary
The Bhutanese case suggests that competition at the level of the
nation accelerated political unification and efforts to establish a
shared national identity (Schappi 2005), promote social cohesion
(within-group cooperation), and protect the nation’s cultural and
environmental sovereignty. These changes were also facilitated by
the centralized power of a hereditary monarchy. Bhutan’s policies
put in place constraints on individual and community-level
resource use. The associated costs of these restrictions appear to
have been offset by a focus on well-being and happiness and the
acceptance of those costs seems to have been eased by the strong
sense of national identity. The CMLS framework also leads us to
consider the possibility that Bhutan’s recent transition from a
hereditary monarchy to a parliamentary democracy is likely to
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increase competition between political parties, which may change
the selection regime and ultimately weaken the environmental
components of the GNH approach.
Air quality policy in California
An investigation of air quality policy in California shipping ports
displays a cooperative cascade across levels of public government,
which resulted in successful regulatory solutions (see Fig. 5).
Fig. 5. Clean air regulations at California shipping ports may
have been adopted in part because of between-port
competition. Poor air quality from shipping ports drove citizens
to form a collective unit to change policy. The resulting lawsuit
required cleaner shore power at one port, which then pushed
for identical regulations for a neighboring port. Shore power
was then adopted all California ports. Allowing vessel power
(–), requiring costly shore power (+), collective action, e.g.,
citizen political organization (↑ up arrow). Shaded cells
represent dominant level of selection.

Focal trait
Ocean-going vessels account for the majority of port-related
emissions of particulate matter, NOx and SO2 (POLA 2005).
When berthed, ocean-going vessels require power for ancillary
ship systems. We focus on the corporate use of shore-based
electrical power as an alternative to running ship engines when
berthed. Shore power requires investments by both port
authorities and shipping companies, whereas the benefits of the
technology are bestowed primarily upon local residents in the
form of reduced noxious emissions. Shore power adoption
therefore constitutes a social dilemma.
Organizational environment
Shipping companies compete for profit, and implementing lowemission shore power systems is costly. The Port of Los Angeles
(POLA) and the Port of Long Beach (POLB) are publically owned
ports in adjacent cities on San Pedro Bay, and they compete for
shipping traffic. The economic benefits of the shipping ports
accrue at the local, state, and national levels through tax revenue
and domestic jobs (BST Associates 2007). Local residents bear
disproportionate costs in terms higher rates of asthma (LBACA
2008), cardiovascular disease, and cancer (Barringer 2005) than
those of the nation.
Levels of selection
At the corporate level, competition between shipping companies
favors the use of vessel-based power in port, because the health
costs are externalized to individual residents. The neighboring
ports compete for shipping traffic, such that either port would
lose business by adopting air quality restrictions that increase the
cost to corporations. As a result, selection at the level of the port

also favors vessel power. Similarly, tax revenue from ports selects
for industry-friendly policies at the level of the state. At the level
of individual local residents, evidence of negative health effects
selects against supporting vessel power, although residents have
no direct recourse on the trait.
History
In 2001, local residents concerned with the health effects of
emissions joined to oppose the construction of a new container
terminal at POLA. Despite this opposition, the city approved
construction of the terminal. Homeowner groups then joined
forces, forming San Pedro and Peninsula Homeowners United,
and enlisted the help of the Natural Resources Defense Council.
Together, they sued the City of Los Angeles and the Army Corps
of Engineers for violations of the California Environmental
Quality Act, and won (NRDC 2012). Three years later the new
POLA terminal opened as the first shore power container facility
in the world. With the ports so close together, POLA could hardly
be penalized for emissions it might not be causing. Pressure on
POLB to operate with equivalent regulations mounted. Two years
later POLA and POLB joined to create the San Pedro Bay Ports
Clean Air Action Plan, which precludes attempts to undercut each
other in terms of environmental regulation rigor. Components of
the San Pedro Bay Ports Clean Air Action Plan were later imitated
at the state level, and now shore power is required at all major
California ports.
Summary
This example illustrates how a collective action among individuals
in response to a local environmental dilemma can initiate a
cooperative cascade in the domain of public government,
resulting in successful regulatory solutions. This result appears to
have been aided by the strength of California environmental laws,
public ownership of commercial ports, and strong competition
between neighboring ports. It may also have been assisted by weak
selection on corporations to oppose the regulations either through
low relative costs of implementing shore power or strong
competition between shipping companies for California business.
Litter in the United States
The history of littering and litter regulations in the United States
demonstrates the importance of examining competitive
interactions between governmental and corporate organizational
domains in determining environmental outcomes (Melosi 2005;
see Fig. 6).
Focal trait
We define individual littering behavior as the act of leaving
nonbiodegradable packaging and disposable waste in the open.
Litter production is the manufacture of materials that eventually
become litter. Littering and litter production together pose a
social dilemma in that all individuals and groups benefit from a
reduction in litter and litter production, but no individual or
group benefits by bearing the cost of reducing litter or litter
production, or enforcing bans or regulations to stop it.
Organizational environment
Democratic governments at the city, state, and national levels
represent their citizens and help solve collective-action problems
and cooperation dilemmas, often by passing legislation, including
banning certain individual or corporate actions or products.
Private corporations in the fast food, soft drink, cigarette, and
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Fig. 6. Corporations appear to have formed a cooperative
supergroup to avoid the costs of solving the litter problem. In
the 1950s litter was a growing problem. Litter regulations began
to spread, putting costs on litter-producing corporations. In
response, corporations formed a cooperative public advocacy
group with the goal of casting the responsibility for litter
cleanup on individuals. State regulations halted the spread of
these litter regulations, and today litter is broadly considered an
individual responsibility. Littering and litter production (–),
litter cleanup and reduced production (+), cooperation and
collective action (↑ up arrow). Shaded cells represent dominant
level of selection in both corporate and governmental domains.

packaging industries benefit by selling goods to consumers and
producing disposable packaging to deliver them efficiently.
Levels of selection
Litter accumulation negatively influences the health and
environment of individuals and municipalities. Because the
individual benefit of littering is immediate and tangible, whereas
the costs of litter are indirect and accumulate over time, individual
selection favors littering. At the levels of the city and state,
governments gain the benefits of better hygiene, better living
conditions, and increased property values from reduced litter
accumulation. The costs of enforcing antilittering policy vary
from cheap (producer bans) to expensive (public waste
management systems). These conditions select for cheap
antilittering policy at the group level in government. Like
governments, corporations could opt to prevent littering with
biodegradable or reduced packaging or collection systems at a
cost to their financial welfare. Corporations that bear such costs
when other corporations do not will be selected against in a market
economy. Both corporations and governments themselves can
form collections of groups, or “supergroups.” However, these
supergroups are without peers or face no pressure beyond
satisfying in the interests of their constituents.
History
In the early 20th century, discarded waste became a public
problem because individuals and businesses discarded waste in
public spaces, streets, and rivers. In the 1950s it was unclear
whether the costs of the litter problem would be born by
governments through waste management systems or corporations
through extended producer responsibility. In 1953, Vermont
passed the first law to ban nonrefillable bottles. Other states
followed suit. In the 1960s and 1970s, major national
environmental legislation proliferated, and nine more states
adopted bottle deposit laws in the 1970s and 1980s (CRI 2009).
Following the Vermont bill, an association of corporations from
the beverage, packaging, and tobacco industries founded the
industrial advocacy group Keep America Beautiful (KAB; CRI

2009, KAB 2013) with a mission to “engage individuals in
responsibility for improving their community environments”
(IRS 2013). KAB’s campaigns downplay legislative solutions that
extend producer responsibility and promote individually focused
antilittering campaigns and community cleanup drives (Melosi
2005, Royte 2007). One KAB campaign proclaimed: “People Start
Pollution, People Can Stop It.” KAB remains active and well
funded today (IRS 2013, KAB 2014), and has successfully
influenced cultural norms about where the responsibility for litter
lies.
Summary
The history of litter in the United States reveals a core
environmental dilemma that triggered cooperative cascades in
both the corporate and governmental domains. First, individuals
cooperated through public government to solve the problem,
producing regulations that cascaded and grew through the levels
of governmental hierarchy. Federal and state regulation imposed
a selection pressure on corporations, who then cooperated to
produce a supergroup to solve their collective problem by making
litter a public rather than a corporate responsibility. The success
of corporate supergroup KAB reveals that organizations at the
same level in different domains, e.g., government and corporate,
may often compete regarding environmental dilemmas, resolving
the original cooperation dilemma (littering) only to recapitulate
it at a higher level (hidden costs of landfills).
ROUTES FOR INTERVENTIONS
We believe that as the CMLS perspective matures it will be able
contribute to the design and evaluation of sustainability policy.
Previous frameworks, including polycentricity and panarchy,
suggest social-ecological solutions constitute a “fit” to a
particular local context and can be discovered through
experimentation. The evolutionary aspect of the framework
naturally leads to experimentation as well, but cultural evolution
additionally provides a map of the process by which solutions
come to be fit in the first place. For example, adaptive capacity is
a potent but vague concept in the sustainability literature. An
evolutionary approach clarifies the mechanisms of adaptation
and offers the possibility of developing measurements of adaptive
capacity. We show how the CMLS framework reveals the
evolutionary mechanisms that underlie current environmental
conservation policies and point toward new ideas for
interventions.
Target the appropriate level of selection
We must first discover how CMLS bears on current policies. For
interventions, one major insight is that the dominant level of
selection will vary between systems that may otherwise seem
similar. Take, for example, residential energy conservation efforts.
Research has shown that in residential neighborhoods
conservation policies targeting individual behavior have been
effective (Ayres et al. 2013), whereas in college dormitories policies
that target group behavior have proven successful (Petersen et al.
2007). This may be because the dominant level of selection for
electricity consumption behavior differs between residential
neighborhoods, i.e., households, and college dormitories, i.e.,
coresident social groups. Therefore, identifying the dominant level
of selection in a given system may help guide future policy efforts.
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Alter the level of selection
We suspect that some common intervention strategies may be
successful because they do alter the level of selection. Economic
incentives such as subsidies and taxes are common and effective
environmental policy tools. When a tax or subsidy is applied to a
social dilemma, its application may alter the dominant level of
selection. Therefore, these financial instruments might be applied
more precisely by considering their influence on the balance of
selective forces between levels as the focal outcome. Third-party
certification systems may also change the dominant level of
selection. The emergence of collective action as a result of Marine
Stewardship Council certification may be one such case. Foley
and McCay (2014) suggest the availability of a lucrative new
“sustainable” fish market spurs collective action among fishing
groups within a fishery because access to that market depends on
certification. Because certification is tied to an independent
fishery assessment, no fishing group can achieve certification
alone. This forces fishers to cooperate and form a larger group to
maintain certification and the market it provides. Thus, the
Marine Stewardship Council process enhances participation in
part by changing the dominant level of selection from fishers to
the fishery. Altering the level of selection may not always be
possible or advisable, but the possibility provides an additional
lens to evaluate and select effective policy options.
Shift trait variation across levels
Trait variation provides the raw material for selective processes
that drive behavioral and institutional adaptation. Current
research on cultural trait variation tends to focus on the influence
of variation within groups or populations. For instance, evidence
suggests that at a variety of scales, greater ethnic variation is
associated with reduced social cohesion and cooperative
outcomes (Alesina et al. 1999, Ruttan 2006, Waring and Bell
2013). Meanwhile, individual variation, ethnic and otherwise,
appears to increase creativity in small groups (McLeod et al. 1996,
Paulus and Nijstad 2003). What the present research misses,
however, is the way in which variation is distributed within versus
between groups, and how that distribution might be managed
productively. Because selection is roughly proportional to
available trait variation, policies that increase trait diversity at a
given level may often enhance selection at that level. Variation
can be shifted between levels by policies that encourage or
discourage sorting of individuals. Specifically, encouraging
individuals to join groups that are homogenous for the relevant
trait should increase between-group selection for the trait,
whereas sorting individuals into diverse groups is likely to shift
the balance of selection toward the individual level. For example,
educational research has measured the influence of sorting
students into homogenous learning groups on student learning
outcomes (Beebe-Frankenberger et al. 2004, Collins and Gan
2013). Likewise, sustainability interventions that manage the
distribution of the sustainability-relevant cultural traits across
levels may help facilitate stronger selection on the desired level.
Other policy levers on trait variation include migration,
communication, and social learning, as well as direct approaches
to incentivize or discourage innovation.
Leverage the evolution of cooperation
The evolution of cooperation can also be leveraged to achieve
sustainability goals. We’ve argued that humans are skilled at
forming cooperative groups to overcome adaptive challenges and

that sustainability is itself a multipronged adaptive challenge.
Although we cannot provide a blueprint for such policy solutions,
the factors that tend to enhance the evolution of cooperation are
well known and include smaller group size, repeat interactions,
punishment mechanisms, and reputation effects. Thus, as Ostrom
(2010b) argued, the process of cooperative self-organization,
utilized loosely in private enterprise, might be a powerful policy
tool for the evolution of cooperative conservation of the
commons. Wilson and colleagues (2014) argue that the
determinants of group success are sufficiently understood to
merit their application to improving group outcomes today
(Evolution Institute, Prosocial groups http://www.prosocialgroups.
org/).
Avoid ethnocentric solutions
One concern, however, is in the strength of ethnocentric
institutions. Humans have group-level adaptations that make the
emergence of groupcentric, ethnocentric, nationalistic, and racist
institutions common. Ethnocentric institutions tend to emerge
when social identity (religious, ethnic, racial) comes to correlate
with group membership. When they do arise, ethnocentric
institutions draw on parochial altruism and social identity
psychology, and can become stronger than equivalent egalitarian
institutions. Ethnocentric institutions should be avoided for
obvious humanitarian reasons. The CMLS perspective gives us a
means to explain their emergence and persistence, and to
strategically avoid situations that could lead to their emergence.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Our framework represents a first step toward an evolutionary and
applied theory of sustainability, but much remains to be done.
First, the framework should be tested and expanded by applying
it to established bodies of research that systematically explore the
emergence of sustainable practices. For instance, research on
voluntary environmental governance (Prakash and Potoski 2006,
Potoski and Prakash 2009) is organized around the economic
concept of clubs and club goods that closely parallels the
evolutionary model of adaptive groups. Likewise, psychologists
studying hierarchical organizations have developed a body of
research on multilevel interactions, concerned with emergence of
organizational traits and the role of trait variation (Kozlowski
and Klein 2000) within an implicitly evolutionary framework.
These connections provide excellent opportunities for theoretical
cross-fertilization and empirical development.
Additionally, the CMLS framework could enable a
reinterpretation of classic studies. We can hypothesize that the
emergence of coordination in Subak irrigation networks in Bali
(Lansing and Kremer 1993) may have resulted from stronger
selection at the level of the water collective than the level of the
farmer. In Maine, where the practice of marking female breeding
lobsters for conservation has been studied with a cultural
evolutionary model (Acheson and Gardner 2011), we could ask
whether competition and strong selection at the level of the harbor
gang might have driven the emergence of the trait.
The framework should also be of immediate use to those presently
studying multiscale system dynamics (Holdschlag and Ratter
2013) and multilevel governance of ecological systems (Cash et
al. 2006), and in cases where data have been collected at multiple
levels over time. For these sorts of studies, applying the framework
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would be a matter of organizing the facts into a rubric as we have
demonstrated and using the resulting patterns to generate testable
hypotheses. To move from generating to testing hypotheses,
however, will require both theoretical and methodological
development.

NIFA Hatch project #1003317. We thank Mark Anderson, Vicken
Hillis, Sean Hoban, Peter Richerson, Kathleen Quirk, Monique
Borgerhoff-Mulder, the human and cultural evolution group at UC
Davis, and two anonymous reviewers for invaluable critique.

Theoretical development is needed to refine our expectations
about how social and ecological factors jointly influence the
evolution of environmental cooperation. For this we need to
develop consistent methods for modeling CMLS phenomena and
to merge CMLS models with detailed biophysical models. We
need to address numerous theoretical questions as well. When can
it be said that there is no dominant level of selection? How does
group-level selection influence environmental traits that are not
embedded in social dilemmas? When does the sociopolitical
landscape determine selection pressures for environmental
behavior, and when not? Theoretical work can also help improve
our understanding of how to analyze CMLS phenomena most
accurately. Finally, we hope that the CMLS framework will be
integrated with extant frameworks for SES change.
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